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A constructive, highly professional relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers is
essential for tax compliance. The aim of the present paper was to explore systematically
the determinants of this relationship and related tax compliance behaviors based
on the extended slippery slope framework. We used in-depth qualitative interviews
with 33 self-employed taxpayers and 30 tax auditors. Interviewees described the
relationship along the extended slippery slope framework concepts of power and trust.
However, also novel sub-categories of power (e.g., setting deadlines) and trust (e.g.,
personal assistance) were mentioned. Furthermore, also little-studied categories of tax
behavior emerged, such as accepting tax behavior, e.g., being available to the tax
authorities, or stalling tax behavior, e.g., the intentional creation of complexity. The results
comprehensively summarize the determinants of the tax relationship and tax compliance
behaviors. Additionally, results highlight future research topics and provide insights for
policy strategies.
Keywords: public institutions, public administration, tax compliance, tax evasion, cooperation, power, trust
INTRODUCTION
The quality of the interaction climate between tax authorities and taxpayers is increasingly deemed
important for tax compliance. Whereas studies historically considered simple stimulus-response
mechanisms such as the influence of an increased tax rate on tax compliance (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972), today practice, and research increasingly considers the relationship between tax
authorities and taxpayers (Braithwaite, 2002; Feld and Frey, 2002; Kirchler, 2007). For instance,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013) promotes cooperative relationships between tax
authorities and taxpayers, and encourages tax administrations to build up trust-based interactions
with honest taxpayers. These new policy perspectives are supported by theories such as the
responsive regulation theory (Braithwaite, 2002, 2003) and the slippery slope framework of tax
compliance (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008). Responsive regulation theory proposes that tax
authorities manage their relationships with taxpayers as response to the taxpayers’ motivational
postures (Braithwaite, 2007). Akin to other theoretical accounts (e.g., Feld and Frey, 2007; Luttmer
and Singhal, 2014), the slippery slope framework suggests that two key determinants (i.e., the power
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of authorities and trust in authorities) related to classical
economic deterrence factors such as audits and fines, as well
as psychological factors related to fairness and reciprocity rules,
shape the tax climate, and in turn, tax compliance (Gangl
et al., 2015). However, in spite of practical acknowledgment
and the existence of several theoretical models concerning
the relationship climate, empirical knowledge regarding the
determinants that shape the interaction process and resulting tax
behavior remains to be further investigated.
The first aim of the present explorative research is, based on
in-depth interviews with Austrian taxpayers and tax auditors,
to empirically examine the theoretical constructs regarding the
actors’ relationship and tax compliance behaviors that are defined
in the extended slippery slope framework. The second aim is, to
identify novel sub-categories about tax behavior and its perceived
relationship antecedents to generate new research hypotheses.
In contrast to quantitative experimental and survey approaches,
which often over-simplify compliance behavior, use closed
questions and investigate student samples, our interview-based
approach which includes both tax auditors and self employed
taxpayers, will increase the practical relevance of insights into the
tax compliance relationship, allowing to detect concepts that have
not been considered so far. There is only one previous study, to
the best of our knowledge, which investigates taxpayers and tax
auditors (Kirchler et al., 2006).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Extended Slippery Slope Framework
The slippery slope framework was developed as a conceptual
tool to organize research on tax compliance determinants into
two dimensions: power of authorities and trust in authorities
(Kirchler et al., 2008). Power defines research predominantly in
economics and is defined as the potential and ability of an entity
to influence another entity’s behavior (Freiberg, 2010). Trust
summarizes predominantly psychological approaches and refers
to taxpayers’ perception of tax authorities’ competence and their
behavior in the interest of the community (Kirchler et al., 2008).
Both determinants affect tax behavior, although power fosters
an antagonistic relationship climate, whereas trust leads to a
synergistic climate. In the case of the former, compliance is based
on strict enforcement, whereas in the latter, compliance is based
on voluntary or committed cooperation (Kirchler et al., 2008).
According to the extended slippery slope framework (Gangl
et al., 2015), power, and trust are further differentiated. For
instance, the power of authorities is divided into coercive and
legitimate power (Turner, 2005; Tyler, 2006). Coercive power
is related to classical economic theories on tax compliance,
incentivizing a rational taxpayer through punishment, and
rewards (Becker, 1968; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Legitimate
power, on the other hand, summarizes social and legal
psychological ideas about influencing citizens by gaining their
acceptance through being perceived inter alia as legitimized and
as acting professionally (Tyler, 2006). The dimension of trust
in authorities refers to dual process theories (i.e., system 1 and
system 2) on cognition (e.g., Kahneman, 2003) and trust (e.g.,
Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Misztal, 1996), and differentiates trust
in reason-based and implicit trust (Castelfranchi and Falcone,
2010). Reason-based trust is defined as taxpayers’ deliberate
conclusion that the tax authorities can be trusted based on a series
of criteria such as tax authorities’ perceived goals. Finally, implicit
trust is defined as inter alia taxpayers’ automatic and unconscious
trust reactions to stimuli such as an official-looking document
(Gangl et al., 2015). In order to explain the development of
and change in tax relationships, the extended slippery slope
framework integrates a wide range of theories on cognition
(Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 2008), leadership (French and Raven,
1959; Avolio and Bass, 1991), and social and organizational
relationships (Lewin et al., 1939; Ouchi, 1979; Haslam and Fiske,
1999; Adler, 2001; Alm and Torgler, 2011).
Tax Authorities’ Power
In the following section, and based on the extended slippery
slope framework’s concepts of power and trust, we review and
categorize research on tax compliance determinants, particularly
relationship determinants as well as the different qualities of tax
compliance behaviors, by incorporating the latest findings from
psychological, economic, legal, and administrative research. After
each section, we present our research questions.
Coercive power
Coercive power is defined as the possibility of deterring tax
evasion and fostering tax honesty by using enforcement and
incentives. Based on the theory of the social bases of power
(French and Raven, 1959; Raven, 1993; Raven et al., 1998) and in
line with research on taxes, we differentiate between punishment
power and reward power as forms of coercive power. Although
Raven et al. (1998) called this forms of power harsh power, we stay
with the term coercive power as previous research on regulation
of citizens’ behavior (Turner, 2005).
Punishment power in the form of audits and fines is probably
the instrument that is most commonly used by tax authorities
to enforce compliance (e.g., Andreoni et al., 1998; Kastlunger
et al., 2009; Kirchler et al., 2010; Castro and Scartascini,
2013). Punishment power operates in line with the standard
economic model of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968) and the
standard model of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972). The models state that individuals evaluate the probability
and consequences of audits and punishment of law violation.
Given that individuals and firms are assumed to seek profit
maximization, next to income and tax rate, compliance is
essentially considered a function of detection probability, and
severity of sanctions (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan,
1973). Thus, all possibilities to coercively enforce compliance by
maximizing detection, e.g., based on third-party information or
withholding taxes, increase tax honesty (Luttmer and Singhal,
2014). More recent research has additionally examined public
disclosure in the form of transparent tax returns (Bø et al.,
2014) or black lists (Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2015) as coercive
measures to deter tax evasion.
Research question 1a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of punishment power (audits, fines and
public disclosure)?
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Research question 1b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of punishment that have not been
considered in the literature?
Akin to punishment power as negative reinforcement, reward
power in the form of positive reinforcement is considered in
the decision to comply or not comply (Feld et al., 2006).
Rewards for compliant behavior are also considered a form of
coercion, and are likely to crowed-out intrinsic motivation to
cooperate (Deci, 1971; Frey, 1997). Tax research on the effects
of monetary and non-monetary rewards is rather scarce and
findings are inconsistent (Falkinger and Walther, 1991; Torgler,
2002; Feld et al., 2006; Feld and Frey, 2007; Kastlunger et al.,
2010). For instance, studies examine the impact of lottery tickets
(Bazart and Pickhard, 2011), wellness vouchers (Koessler et al.,
2016), or the promise of privileged treatment (Simone et al.,
2013). Although, rare empirical evidence for the effect exists,
some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hope to increase
tax compliance by honoring honest taxpayers through positive
disclosure (see for example1).
Research question 2a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reward power (monetary, non-
monetary or positive disclosure)?
Research question 2b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reward power that have not been
considered in the literature?
Legitimate power
In the extended slippery slope framework, legitimate power is
characterized by the legitimacy of the tax authority (Hofmann
et al., 2014; Gangl et al., 2015). Based on theories of legitimacy
(Tyler, 1990, 2006; Turner, 2005) and social bases of power
(French and Raven, 1959; Raven et al., 1998), legitimate power
is seen as soft power, comprising positional power, information
power, expert power, and referent power. Although Raven et al.
(1998) called this form of power soft power, we stick with
the terminology of the regulation of citizens’ behavior, and call
soft power legitimate power (Turner, 2005). Positional power
refers to the perception that the authority has the legal right
to levy taxes. Information power is based on tax authorities’
circulation of relevant information. Expert power means that tax
authorities are perceived as skilled and professionally trained.
Referent power refers to authorities’ capacity to influence
taxpayers based on their own positive image (Raven et al.,
1998). The different categories of legitimate power are related
to the perception of a transparent and fair tax system (Wenzel,
2002; Bradford et al., 2014), facilitating the taxpayer’s voice, and
participation (Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Feld
and Tyran, 2002) in levying and spending taxes. Rich empirical
data regarding the effectiveness of proxies for legitimate power
indicate a positive relationship between customer orientation,
perceived legitimacy, provision of relevant information and
supportive procedures, knowledge and skills, and tax compliance
(Alm et al., 2010; Hartner et al., 2011; Gangl et al., 2013;
Hofmann et al., 2014).
1fairtaxmark.com
Research question 3a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of legitimate power (positional, expert,
information and referent)?
Research question 3b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive forms of legitimate power that have not been
considered in the literature?
Taxpayers’ Trust in the Tax Authority
Citizens’ trust in authorities is of paramount importance with
regard to law compliance (e.g., Tyler, 1997; Jackson et al., 2012)
and this is particularly relevant in the tax relationship (e.g., Scholz
and Lubell, 1998; Feld and Frey, 2002; Murphy, 2004; Kirchler
et al., 2008; Hammar et al., 2009; van Dijke and Verboon, 2010).
Taxpayers trust the tax authority either deliberately or implicitly
(Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Gangl et al., 2015).
Implicit trust
Implicit trust in the tax authority originates from an automatic,
unconscious reaction based on associative and conditional
learning processes (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Based on
such associative experiences, individuals learn that in some
situations they can trust to a greater degree than in others. For
instance, if taxpayers possess positive experiences of interacting
with the tax authority, they are more likely to trust them in
the future without thinking about it (Gangl et al., 2015; see also
trust based on reciprocity and reputation, e.g., King-Casas et al.,
2005). Implicit trust is related to a perceived shared identity
and shared values (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010). Individuals
are more likely to trust those who they perceive similar to
themselves (e.g., concerning sociodemographic background) and
who share their views, interests and values (Kirchler et al., 2006).
Relatedly, a perception that the tax authorities treat taxpayers
as equal partners and exhibit empathy for their problems is
likely to trigger implicit trust (Gangl et al., 2015). Finally,
cues such as official documents, smiling faces and friendly
voices can also stimulate automatic trust. Empirical studies
show that proxies of implicit trust such as nudges (Behavioural
Insights Team, 2011; Chirico et al., 2017) of social norms
(Hallsworth et al., 2017) or reminders of a shared national
identity (Gangl et al., 2016a,b) can increase tax compliance.
However, the quantitative approach of most preexisting studies
may explain why empirical evidence regarding the relevance
of implicit trust on tax behavior remains scarce (Hofmann
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, many tax authorities seek to trigger
implicit trust, such as through advertisements or appealing
website designs.
Research question 4a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of implicit trust (automatic trust,
experience, shared values, empathy, and perception of
being equal stakeholders)?
Research question 4b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of implicit trust that have not been
considered in the literature?
Reason-based trust
Reason-based trust is based on deliberate considerations
concerning taxpayers’ dependency on the tax authorities and the
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importance of tax authorities’ goals (Castelfranchi and Falcone,
2010; Gangl et al., 2015). In addition, taxpayers consider internal
factors of the tax authorities such as competence, motivation,
and benevolence and external factors, which may be relevant
for the work of the authorities, such as economic and political
conditions (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Hofmann et al.,
2014; Gangl et al., 2015). Considerable empirical and theoretical
evidence exists concerning the positive effects of deliberate
forms of trust on cooperation, such as knowledge-based trust
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) and rational trust (Ripperger, 1998).
Conceptually, reason-based trust, especially internal factors,
overlap with legitimate power (e.g., Malhotra and Murnighan,
2002; Hofmann et al., 2017a). They represent two sides of the
same tax relationship: the legitimate power of the authorities is
a perception of influence, and reason-based trust of taxpayers
is the decision to be vulnerable based on the influencing entity
and its environment. Numerous studies have demonstrated that
reason-based trust (e.g., Murphy, 2004; Wahl et al., 2010; Gangl
et al., 2013; Kogler et al., 2013) and its proxies such as perceived
institutional quality and corruption (e.g., Cummings et al., 2009;
Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Gangl et al., 2017) are essential
for tax compliance.
Research question 5a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reason-based trust (dependency,
shared goals, internal factors and external factors)?
Research question 5b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of reason-based trust that have not been
considered in the literature?
Tax Compliance Behavior
In the slippery slope framework, and similar to numerous
theoretical and empirical accounts, only small subsets of
tax compliance behaviors (such as honest payment and tax
avoidance; see however Kirchler and Wahl, 2010, who developed
scales on voluntary compliance, enforced compliance, tax
avoidance, and evasion) are distinguished (Kirchler et al.,
2008; Gangl et al., 2015). Furthermore, in the seminal work
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), tax
compliance is defined as the amount of honestly paid, or evaded
tax. Most empirical work applying laboratory experiments and
surveys is based on this simplified view on tax compliance
(Alm et al., 1995; Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017b).
However, practitioners such as tax administrations (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2004)
hold a more complex understanding of tax compliance. They
see it as consisting of, e.g., correct registration as a taxpayer,
completing tax reports on time, reporting complete and accurate
information, and paying taxes on time. Others differentiate
between filing compliance, payment compliance, and reporting
compliance (Brown and Mazur, 2003), or administrative
compliance (i.e., registering, reporting, and time requirements)
and technical compliance (i.e., taxes are calculated based on the
technical requirements of the law, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2001). Finally, tax
authorities distinguish commercial tax avoidance as legal tax
reduction within the brackets of the law (e.g., claiming refund
for investments) from aggressive tax avoidance, as tax reduction
against the spirit of the law (e.g., cross-border profit shifting
and tax flight; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development [OECD], 2001).
Research question 6a: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive different categories of tax compliance behavior
(honest taxpaying, tax evasion, tax registration, timely
filing, correct reporting, commercial tax planning, and
aggressive tax planning)?
Research question 6b: Do tax auditors and taxpayers
perceive categories of tax behaviors that have not been
considered in the literature?
METHOD: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW
STUDY
In order to answer the research questions and to depict the
perception of the tax stakeholders, we followed a qualitative
approach and conducted semi-structured interviews. Qualitative
psychological research investigates the distinctive characteristics
of experience of persons and is usually distinguished from
quantitative methods adapted from natural sciences (Fischer,
2005). A qualitative approach is appropriate for investigating
exploratory questions, such as the tax auditors’ and taxpayers’
perception of power and trust, as well as tax behaviors, as it
gives voice to the subjective experience of the interviewees.
Our qualitative approach builds on social constructivism and
social representations theory, proposing that knowledge and
attitudes about tax issues are gained through social interaction,
communication and discussion in peer-groups, and insights from
media reports (c.f., Moscovici, 1998; Peters, 2010).
We interviewed self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors
as relevant stakeholders. We choose self-employed because
compared to employed taxpayers in Austria their taxes are not
withheld by the employer; rather they need to declare their gross
income and pay taxes out of pocket. Thus, they have likely
more experience with interactions with the tax authorities. In the
following section, we present the sample, recruitment technique
and interview procedures for both self-employed taxpayers and
auditors. The results are presented subsequently.
Self-Employed Taxpayers
Sample
In total, 33 Austrian self-employed taxpayers with small to
medium size businesses participated in the study. Participants (15
of whom were female) were on average 44.34 years old (N = 32;
one person did not indicate his/her age; SDage = 11.69), and
had on average 10.58 years (SD = 10.31) of experience as self-
employed persons. The number of employees working for the
self-employed taxpayers ranged from 0 (48.5%) to 50 (5.9%);
41.2% of those who employed personnel claimed to only have
one employee. The majority of participants reported an annual
turnover of less than 25,000 EUR (nine taxpayers), or between
25,000 EUR and 50,000 EUR (nine taxpayers). The majority of
self-employed taxpayers (17 taxpayers) utilized a tax advisor.
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Concerning their experience with the tax authority, 11 taxpayers
reported that they had been audited at least once.
Procedure and Material
Interviewees were recruited via a market research agency in 2013.
All interviews were conducted by one interviewer, accompanied
by two assistants, who tape-recorded the interviews. Interviews
were semi-structured, lasting between 30 and 90 min. Following
the interview, a short questionnaire was completed to gather
information regarding the participants’ demographics and their
businesses (see Supplementary Material). Interviews opened
with a general question concerning taxpayers’ experience with
the tax authority, thus affording them full freedom of expression.
Subsequent questions delved into the tax authorities’ potential to
affect tax behavior (power of the tax authority), taxpayers’ trust
in the authority, and the impact of power and trust on their tax
compliance. The interview questions were on taxes in general and
did not specify a specific kind of tax. The interview guideline
and questions were developed with the help of an experienced
advisory board of tax researchers, including improvement loops
based on test interviews. The interview materials can be found
in the Supplementary Material, the transcripts can be found
at osf.io/nv285/. Participants were remunerated with 50 EUR
(approximately 53.35 USD).
Tax Auditors
Sample
Overall, 30 Austrian tax auditors (13 of whom were female)
who were on average 46.73 years (SD = 4.59) old participated
in the study. Tax auditors reported their job experience, ranging
from 6 years (3.3%) to 34 years (3.3%), with an average
20.70 years (SD = 7.52). Participants worked as tax auditors in
three different eastern federal states of Austria; half were from
the city of Vienna (53.3%) and half were from the country
side (Styria: 26.7% and Lower Austria: 20.0%). Half of the
tax auditors were responsible for auditing small and medium
businesses, and the other half were responsible for auditing
large businesses.
Procedure and Material
Access to 30 experienced tax officers was provided by the Austrian
Ministry of Finance in 2013, which ensured that the participants
were evenly distributed in terms of sex, urban vs. rural area,
and area of responsibility. The interviews were conducted in
the offices of the tax auditors by two interviewers. Interviews
were semi-structured and lasted between 30 and 130 min. The
interviews opened with a general question regarding tax auditors’
work, followed by questions about tax authorities’ potential
to shape tax behavior (power of tax authorities), the role of
taxpayers’ trust in the tax authorities, and the impact of power
and trust on tax compliance. The interview questions were on
taxes in general and did not specify a specific kind of tax.
The interview materials can be found in the Supplementary
Material, the transcripts can be found at osf.io/nv285/. No
monetary or other form of remuneration was provided for
participation, but the interviews were conducted during the tax
auditors’ working hours.
Analytical Procedure
The interviews with self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors
were transcribed and analyzed using the qualitative analysis
software NVivo (Qsr International Pty Ltd, 2010). The analysis
followed an inductive as well as deductive approach. Data
were analyzed using qualitative content analysis (QCA; Schreier,
2012), i.e., deriving codes from the data, as well as the extended
slippery slope framework to provide codes. QCA is a method
for systematically describing and conceptualizing the meaning of
qualitative data, such as interviews, by categorizing parts of the
material using a coding frame (Schreier, 2012). QCA is flexible in
such as it is made to fit the material; thus, the coding categories
are not purely theory-based but data driven. After data collection,
two tax researchers read through the interviews, and build a
coding frame based on the basic text and along the extended
slippery slope framework. After the coding process, two other
researchers who were also well-acquainted with tax research
examined each of the categories, checking for homogeneity
within and clear discrimination between them.
RESULTS
Perception of Tax Authorities’ Power
In the following section, we present the results on perceived
power. Table 1 summarizes the findings. The results indicated
that tax auditors and taxpayers perceived the categories known
in the literature, as well as mentioned some additional categories
of authorities’ power.
Coercive Power
Punishment power
As regards research questions 1a,b, the interviews illustrated
that the tax stakeholders do perceive the categories of
punishment power discussed in the literature (audits, fines,
and public disclosure). Punishment power consisted of the
categories of “punishment” (e.g., financial fine or imprisonment),
“audits” (control mechanisms as well as monitoring), “negative
disclosure” (public exposure of tax evaders), and a new category,
“deadlines” (setting deadlines e.g., for taxpayers to submit
documents). As one tax auditor claimed: “And if he stood me up
the fifth time, I write beneath, that I want a deadline.” Like, “Until
that day you have to present the documents” (Tax auditor #08,
male, 41 years). It is of particular interest that “audits” played a
significant role, as this category was mentioned more often than
any other type of power measure. As one self-employed taxpayer
(#13, male, 43 years) claimed: “Well, without monitoring it is not
working for sure.”
Reward Power
Both tax auditors and taxpayers reported monetary and non-
monetary rewards, as well as positive disclosure as aspects of tax
authorities’ reward power (research question 2a). In particular,
reward power consists of the monetary “gain” (e.g., tax reduction
for taxpayers who pay on time – obviously, depending on legal
constraints), non-monetary “praise” (e.g., “thank you letter”
or positive feedback), “positive disclosure” (publicly praising
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TABLE 1 | Results for tax authorities’ power.
Categories Examples
Coercive power
Punishment power Punishment/fines
Audits
Disclosure – negative
Deadlines
(Self-employed taxpayer #26, female, 40 years)
“Somehow it is always a form of punishment [short laugh]”
Reward power Monetary: gain
Non-monetary: praise
Disclosure – positive
Accommodation
Active assistance
(Tax auditor #21, male, 50 years)
“Yes, this is actually a policy taken up more strongly in the last years by the financial administration, with which
we want to reward the honest”
Legtimate power
Position power (Tax auditor #16, male, 49 years)
“Well, I would see it in a way, that when I go out there, I want to leave the impression of a persisting instance,
which ensures that the equality of taxation is adhered to”
Expert power (Self-employed taxpayer #28, male, 60 years)
“The tax authority is certainly the expert”
Referent power Image (Self-employed taxpayer #23, female, 43 years)
“When I identify myself with the state and say ‘OK, the money is used for this or that and Austria is very worth
living and therefore, we need taxes,’ this indeed increases tax honesty”
Information power Individual information
Attain information oneself
Publicity
(Self-employed taxpayer #10, male 31 years)
“Actually, that would be normal. That wouldn’t be so unusual, for example if you receive some kind of
information per mail”
Transparency (Self-employed taxpayer #13, male, 43 years)
“The most important point would rather be transparency, more transparency on the part of the tax authority, so
you know: the activity, the income, the expenditures, the taxes that you pay”
Justice Unfairness (Tax auditor #29, male, 50 years)
“The person vis-à-vis cannot say, ‘I won’t declare parts of my income,’ he has to pay taxes, no matter what tax
rate. It is simply about justice”
Participation (Self-employed taxpayer #16, male, 34 years)
“Of course there is the idea, that you can for example sort of decide, what taxes are used for, well. To a certain
degree, entirely or third. I want to promote this, I want to promote this. Yes, this would simply be a marvelous
way to see, where you want to get that to”
Direct translation.
honest taxpayers), and the new categories (research question 2b)
of “accommodation” (the authority demonstrates goodwill, for
instance when taxpayers can choose the date of an appointment),
and “active assistance” (employers of the authorities go beyond
their role, e.g., by providing helpful tips to honest taxpayers). Tax
auditors reported that they reward taxpayers by praising them
during audits: “Yes, yes. So that is really important. People like that
VERY much, when you praise them. I mean, everyone needs praise
and even if they then [ask]: “So, is that alright like that?” “Yeah,
you did an awesome job.” (Tax auditor #12, female, 48 years).
Some self-employed taxpayers noted that they perceived a lack
of additional tax payment a reward in itself. Many self-employed
taxpayers criticized the random application of rewards, believing
that individual tax auditors offer tax reductions with varying
levels of frequency. For instance, one self-employed taxpayers
compared the auditing situation to a bazaar, whereby taxpayers
and tax auditors are able to bargain about positive and negative
reinforcement: “And what makes me angry is that it became like a
bazaar. So really like at a bazaar.” (Self-employed taxpayer #23,
female, 43 years).
Nevertheless, most of the self-employed taxpayers wanted the
tax authority to have greater opportunities to reward desired
behavior. As one self-employed (#06, male, age not indicated)
said, “Just introduce bonus systems. But this is already what we
do today . . . what I have said before. Well, just bonus systems. Or
MORE bonus systems.”
Legitimate Power
Concerning research questions 3a,b, the interviews revealed that
legitimate power consists of “position power” (the authority
has the right to levy taxes), “expert power” (the authority and
its employees are perceived to be experts), “referent power”
(the authority has a positive image), “information power” (the
authority is circulating information), “transparency” (all tax-
related processes are transparent for the taxpayers), “justice”
(the authority is treating all taxpayers fairly), and “participation”
(taxpayers can take part in decision-making, e.g., how taxes are
used). A tax auditor noted that transparency as information
power is an important topic for self-employed taxpayers,
especially when it comes to the action taken by the tax authority:
“You have to show a lot of transparency in what you are actually
doing” (Tax auditor #14, male, 38 years). Both types of self-
employed taxpayers as well as tax auditors reported mechanisms
of legitimate position power and information power more
frequently than the other categories of legitimate power. A self-
employed taxpayer (#01, female, 52 years) mentioned “[. . .] that
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the tax authorities are legitimate, or simply that they are in the
position, that they then use strategies, well they can implement this
as strategies at taxpayers.” One tax auditor emphasized that it was
important to refer to the legal position of the institution of which
he is a representative: “There have to be rules and I have to tell the
people “I am the tax authority’ when I come to them” (Tax auditor
#33, male, 46 years).
Perception of Trust
Both self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors reported that
taxpayers trust the tax authority implicitly as well as based on
deliberation (Table 2). All categories of implicit and reason-based
trust (Hofmann et al., 2014; Gangl et al., 2015) were mentioned
in the interviews. In addition, new categories were found (e.g.,
implicit trust: personal support; reason-based trust: respect).
Implicit Trust
In line with research question 4a, both types of tax stakeholders
reported that implicit trust consists of the categories “blind trust”
(trusting the authority without thinking about it), “sympathy
and communication” (taxpayers can communicate openly with
employees of the tax authority), “empathy” (feeling of being
understood by the authority), “shared values” (the authority and
the taxpayers share the same values, or weltanschauung), and
“equal stakeholders” (the tax authority and taxpayers interact
at eye level). Furthermore, as regards research question 4b,
“personal support” (taxpayers receive personal support from the
employees of the tax authority) was mentioned as a new category.
Some interviewees spoke quite generally of fundamental or basic
trust (“Grundvertrauen”) in the tax system. As noted by a self-
employed taxpayer: “Well, I believe that in Austria there is
a fundamental trust in the state system and therefore also in
the system of taxation.” (Self-employed taxpayer #12, female,
27 years). Personal support was considered important for implicit
trust: “So if you know the face behind the institution, that tells
you: “Come here, we talk about it” (Self-employed taxpayer” #11,
female, 40 years), given that “for the entrepreneur a personification
of the tax office occurs” (Tax auditor #30, male, 40 years). Many
self-employed taxpayers refused to use the phrase “blind trust”
TABLE 2 | Results for taxpayers’ trust in the tax authority.
Category Examples
Implicit trust Blind-Automatic
trust
Sympathy and
communication
Empathy
Experiences
Shared values
Equal partners
Personal Support
(Self-employed taxpayer #12, female,
27 years)
“I think, that in Austria, a level of basic
trust in the state system and therefore
in the tax system exists”
Reason-based
trust
Common goal
Internal factors
Dependency
External factors
Respect
(Self-employed taxpayer #07, female,
53 years)
“No, no, I think (. . .) that doesn’t work
with sympathy, that really only works
due to facts and actions”
Direct translation.
when discussing their trust in the tax authority, given that
it has a negative connotation, being associated with naivety
toward the authorities’ actions. They preferred instead the phrase
“automatic trust.” As one self-employed taxpayer (#03, female,
35 years) suggested: “Well, simple blind, blind trust that shows a
lot of naivety.”
Reason-Based Trust
The interviews revealed that stakeholders do perceive the
categories of reason-based trust discussed in the extended
slippery slope framework (research question 5a). Reason-based
trust consists of the categories “common goal” (tax authority and
taxpayers share the same goals), “internal factors” (employees
at the tax authority are competent, motivated, and benevolent),
“dependency” (taxpayers depend on the tax authority and
therefore trust the authority), and “external factors” (the
perception of opportunities and dangers). Furthermore, as a
novel category of reason-based trust (research question 5b),
“respect” (respectful communication between the tax authority
and the taxpayers) was mentioned. Tax auditors in particular
claimed that interaction with taxpayers was most successful
where there is mutual respect: “As said before, the encounter.
Every person needs to be respected” (Tax auditor #21, male,
50 years), “and taking them [the taxpayer] seriously and not
talking deprecatory to them.” (Tax auditor #09, male, 41 years).
The interviews revealed that media reports concerning the
unnecessary expenditure of taxes were perceived as important
external factors that hinder the work of the tax authority. One
tax auditor (#17, male, 49 years) stated: “The media – you have
said so already – [. . .] that has an extreme effect.” A second (Tax
auditor #27, male, 54 years) argued: “Based on different media
reports this – how shall I say it – trust is nowadays, I believe, is not
particularly high.” Accordingly, self-employed taxpayers referred
to negative media coverage of the topic of taxes. On the one hand,
they referred to scandalous tax evasions by prominent people, but
on the other hand they talked about the impression that their tax
payments are wasted, e.g., “Through the media you get to know
how much is squandered” (self-employed taxpayer #11, female,
40 years).
Tax Compliance
Taxpayers as well as tax auditors reported a differentiated view
of tax compliance. As shown in Table 3, both groups cited
the relevance of behaviors such as “tax honesty,” “tax evasion,”
and “tax avoidance” for compliance and non-compliance, which
relate to categories that have already been discussed in the tax
literature (research question 6a). However, “tax registration,”
“timely filing,” “correct reporting,” “commercial,” and “aggressive
tax planning” were not explicitly mentioned as distinct categories.
Concerning research question 6b, “accepting tax behavior” and
“stalling tax behavior” were identified as distinct categories. In
the following section, we present the contents of all mentioned
categories of tax behavior.
Tax Honesty
Tax honesty was a relevant category of tax compliance for both
self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors. Being tax honest was
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TABLE 3 | Categories of tax compliance behavior mentioned in the interviews.
Examples
Tax honesty (Self-employed taxpayer #05, male, 47 years)
“The tax honesty in Austria is certainly higher; this is also an
advantage”
Tax evasion (Self-employed taxpayer #06, male, age not indicated)
“If the authority takes advantage of it, then sooner or later it
actually causes tax evasion, because somehow you always
want to take revenge for giving you wrong advice or
saddling you up with too many taxes”
Tax avoidance (Tax auditor #15, female, 53 years)
“And among the big corporations there are always the – not
even loopholes – but legal possibilities to save taxes and
this is actually, this is difficult”
Accepting tax
behavior
(Tax auditor #10, female, 52 years)
“Well (. . .) basically I follow the people – I honestly have to
say that I rarely have difficulties – that the people basically
are very cooperative and it works”
Stalling tax
behavior
(Tax auditor #06, female, 49 years)
“And on the other hand you find audits where the taxpayers
block, where nothing is handed in”
Direct translation.
characterized as paying the full amount of the tax liability, in
particular submitting all documents and transferring the correct
amount of money to the tax authority on time. Self-employed
taxpayers especially perceived tax honesty as significant in
Austria: “I guess that 90% of the people, without knowing the
concrete numbers, are honest” (Self-employed taxpayer #06, male,
age not indicated).
Tax Evasion
When referring to tax evasion, all interviewees cited tax fraud.
Of particular interest was the finding that the great majority
thought of tax evasion as an intended behavior, with relatively
few discussing tax evasion as “sloppy taxpaying” (“Schlampiges
Steuerzahlen”). As a tax auditor (#26, female, 49 years) argued,
“There are firms that do this purely – how should I say –
purely because of sloppiness.” However, at least for some tax
auditors the distinction between intended and observed tax
evasion is important.
Tax Avoidance
Tax avoidance was considered in terms of being commercial
rather than aggressive, and hence as a “normal,” legal and
legitimate way of reducing the tax burden. Self-employed
taxpayers generally talked very positively about this means of
reducing the tax liability, often using the phrase “to save taxes”
(“Steuern sparen”). For example, a self-employed taxpayer (#05,
male, 47 years) claimed: “The more someone possesses, the more
he can employ someone to help save taxes”; moreover, (#21, male,
53 years): “BECAUSE in general the one who pays less tax is
cleverer.” A tax auditor (#08, male, 41 years) argued similarly:
“The citizen is like that, he tries to pay as less taxes as possible.
That is in the nature of the human being.”
Accepting Tax Behavior
Both self-employed taxpayers and tax auditors reported examples
of “accepting tax behavior,” referring to taxpayers who accept tax
authorities’ requests and behave cooperatively when interacting
with the tax authority. Providing ordered and full materials,
being accessible on the telephone, email or in person, and
giving comprehensive answers when asked, were all considered
examples of accepting tax behavior. A self-employed taxpayer
(#08, female, 36 years) argued “[. . .] that you be more precise,
that you be perhaps also more punctual.” A tax auditor mentioned
(#07, male, 48 years) that “If the counterpart is cooperative, it
works pretty easily, it takes the simplest route.”
Stalling Tax Behavior
In accordance with accepting tax behavior, stalling tax behavior
has rarely been considered in previous tax literature. Tax auditors
in particular spoke of taxpayers who fail to cooperate. Failing
to provide all documents, intentionally creating complexity, or
attempting to be inaccessible to the tax authorities comprised
examples of stalling behavior. For instance: “Why is this missing?
Why is it not there? Or how long did someone have time? If you
now say after a week he has said that he brings this and then it is
not there. Or someone has postponed a meeting for the fourth time
and then this occurs” (Tax auditor #08, male, 41 years).
DISCUSSION
Research into tax compliance increasingly postulates that the
quality of the relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers
is an important factor that shapes tax compliance (Braithwaite,
2002; Feld and Frey, 2002; Kirchler, 2007). The results of
the present study indicate that taxpayers and tax auditors
indeed perceive power and trust categories as determinants of
the relationship and use this categories to describe their tax
relationship and tax compliance behavior. Thereby, the present
study offers support for the assumptions of the extended slippery
slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008; Gangl et al., 2015) and
allows a comprehensive and theoretical conceptualization of
the determinants of the tax relationship and tax compliance
behaviors. However, the present results also indicate that the
tax stakeholders perceive categories that have scarcely been
acknowledged in previous research. In addition to the well-
known categories of power and trust, new sub-categories were
identified that should be included in the extended slippery slope
framework. The present research shows in particular, that the
extended slippery slope framework as well as other theoretical
models on the tax relationship (e.g., the responsive regulation
theory) need to consider a larger variety of tax compliance
behaviors. Thereby, the present research highlights research gaps
and facilitates the generation of new research questions.
The results indicated that coercive power as a form of
punishment pertains to audits, fines and negative disclosure
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Bø et al., 2014), as well as
the new category of deadlines. Deadlines are not considered
neutral, but rather as a means of enforcing compliance. To
the best of our knowledge, empirical research on the effect of
deadlines on the tax relationship, on tax compliance or on other
forms of citizens’ compliance with the administration is rare.
Thus, this represents an important starting point for future
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research and policy, because unilaterally established deadlines
are a typical administrative instrument to influence citizens,
and as the results here indicate, they may instigate the negative
consequences of coercive power such as a reduction in trust
and an increase in enforced motivation (Kirchler et al., 2008).
Future quantitative research should examine the ways in which
deadlines might be implemented to render them less aversive.
For example, research on the effect of deadlines on student
assignments has indicated that deadlines do not undermine
intrinsic motivation if students are allowed to actively participate
in the establishment of deadlines (Burgess et al., 2004), thus an
increase in perceived legitimacy.
Reward power is related to monetary and non-monetary
rewards and praise (Bazart and Pickhard, 2011; Simone et al.,
2013; Koessler et al., 2016), as well as to the new categories
“accommodation” (i.e., showing goodwill during the audit) and
“active assistance” (i.e., helping honest taxpayers in accounting
matters). It would appear that for many taxpayers, any
administrative actions that are perceived as cooperative and
as “not punishing” are considered a reward. In addition, our
results demonstrate that taxpayers perceive rewards as something
positive, and not as an additional form of coercion. However,
again the combination with legitimate power might be important.
The interviews indicated that rewards that result from arbitrary
and non-transparent negotiations (e.g., like at a bazaar) can
reduce trust in the administration and in turn preclude any
intrinsic motivation to be honest (Deci, 1971; Frey, 1997). Future
quantitative research should determine whether and under what
conditions rewards can foster trust in the tax system.
The results for legitimate power indicated that (as expected)
this is based on position, expert, referent and information
power (French and Raven, 1959). As regards legitimate power,
no new categories emerged. However, some related constructs
of legitimate power were mentioned frequently, hence we
summarized them into their own categories, including “justice,”
“transparency” and “participation” (Feld and Tyran, 2002). It
can be assumed that these are keywords, especially for taxpayers,
which signal a legitimate tax system. Thus, the present research
indicates that authorities possess numerous options to increase
their perceived legitimacy.
In the tax relationship, implicit trust plays an important role,
as tax stakeholders mentioned all known categories and spoke
of a kind of “basic system trust” in the state and its institutions.
In addition to empathy and perceived partnership, an interesting
new category emerged: long-term “personal support.” The self-
employed claimed to favor a person in the tax administration
who can be considered personally responsible and an expert
on their tax files. Although, personal assigned assistance (e.g.,
at unemployment agencies) is a standard procedure in other
areas of public administration, this is not the case in tax
administration. However exceptions include the specialized units
of individual relationship managers for very wealthy taxpayers
found in the United Kingdom (UK, National Audit Office, 2016).
Future research should clarify whether a personal tax officer
truly enhances trust and reduces stalling behavior, or whether
in contrast this is considered an additional form of monitoring.
In terms of personal support, numerous other (unintended) side
effects must be considered, such as whether tax officers can
remain neutral when they have known a taxpayer for a long
time. Nonetheless, a personal support officer would undoubtedly
represent a strong pillar for fostering a synergistic relationship
between the tax authority and taxpayers. This “service” would
change the culture in the administration, which is currently
perceived by some as an anonymous, bureaucratic machine.
Additionally, the current categories of implicit trust can be used
in future quantitative studies utilizing recognition and speed
tasks to examine whether implicit trust cues really lead to faster
trust reactions than explicit trust cues.
Reason-based trust originates from a perception of a common
goal, dependency, competence, motivation and benevolence;
in sum, a supportive political environment (Castelfranchi and
Falcone, 2010). The interviewees claimed that media reports
play a crucial role in building (or compromising) reason-based
trust, and so further quantitative research should be conducted
to examine the positive and negative effects of media reports
on tax compliance. “Respect,” as a new highlighted category of
reason-based trust, is of course central to the tax relationship.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the term has until
now been used largely superficially (Feld and Frey, 2007) or
considered a means of describing tax authorities’ respect for
the legal rights of taxpayers (Murphy, 2004). In our interviews,
respect meant mutual respect when interacting with each other,
taxpayers’ respect for tax auditors and their expertise, and that
tax auditors encounter taxpayers objectively and appreciatively.
Future research should examine whether taxpayers’ respect has a
real, positive influence on compliance, and whether tax auditors’
respect for taxpayers (e.g., for their hard work) can foster a
synergistic relationship and build voluntary tax compliance.
The interviews also supported previous studies (Kirchler
et al., 2003) that show that taxpayers and tax auditors alike
talk about different categories of tax behavior. In addition
to tax honesty, tax evasion and tax avoidance, the results
indicate the importance of direct cooperative or non-cooperative
contact between self-employed taxpayers and authorities as an
aspect of tax compliance (“accepting behavior” and “stalling
tax behavior”). Accepting tax behavior refers to all proactive
supportive actions and service provisions on the side of the
taxpayers that facilitate the quick and accurate determination
of the real tax burden. In contrast, stalling tax behavior refers
to all actions that jeopardize the work of the tax auditors and
determination of the real tax burden. These new categories
highlight the fact that some taxpayer behaviors are related to
more costly administrative burdens than others. It should be
noted that these categories are distinct from administrative
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD], 2001) or reporting compliance (Brown and Mazur,
2003), because they concern aspects such as being available or
not intentionally creating complexity in bookkeeping, which is
different from filing or submitting material on time. However, in
spite of their obvious relevance, to the best of our knowledge,
little research exists regarding the strategies that influence
taxpayers’ accepting or stalling behavior in collaboration with
tax authorities. We believe that this finding offers important
directions for future research. Another interesting finding was
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that tax auditors spoke of unintentional sloppiness as a factor
behind tax evasion. Future research could examine whether lack
of knowledge or motivation leads to sloppiness in tax filing
and paying and how tax auditors can distinguish intention
from sloppiness. Whereas intention needs compulsory action,
sloppiness (for example, also because of the complex tax system)
can be tolerated by tax auditors and needs supportive service
related actions. Empirical examination of the fostering of ordered
and accepting tax behavior and reducing stalling tax behaviors
has considerable potential in reducing the administrative costs of
collecting taxes.
Although the current approach has its merits, there are
some limitations that must be considered in future research.
The current research takes into account only one country
with a relatively high level of trust in public institutions
(Alm and Torgler, 2006; Schneider et al., 2010). The present
results are, thus, most generalizable only to other European
countries with similar tax morale, especially Germany, which
shares a similar legal and cultural background with Austria
(see Supplementary Material for details on the Austrian tax
system). Thus, the present results might not fully capture the
reality of developing countries (and others) that have large
populations of non-filers (Gangl et al., 2017). Also the view of
additional stakeholders, in particular the tax advisors is missing
in the present research. In addition, our results are unlikely
generalizable to large international corporations. Based on our
sample selection, our results apply to self-employed taxpayers
and less likely to employed taxpayers. However, self-employed
taxpayers who have to submit their taxes personally likely have
more experiences with the tax authority and with taxpaying
compared to employed taxpayers who’s taxes are deducted
automatically. Due to our aim to investigate a large diversity
of views and due to the qualitative research design with a
relative small sample, it is not possible to determine whether
the perceptions of tax auditors and taxpayers differ. We find
that both stakeholder groups hold similar perceptions. They gave
similar examples of power, trust and tax compliance. Although,
we do not find indication of clear differences, we suggest that
future quantitative research (e.g., example questions can be
found in the Supplementary Material) targets different views of
stakeholders and gives priority to similarities and differences to
understand possible misunderstands and conflicts. We used the
extended slippery slope framework to review the literature and to
categorize the interview data. Thus, applying different theoretical
models might lead to other categories. However, given that the
extended slippery slope framework builds on established theories
of taxation (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Braithwaite, 2002;
Kirchler, 2007), power (French and Raven, 1959; Tyler, 2006),
trust (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010), regulatory relationships
(Ouchi, 1979; Adler, 2001), and cognitive processing (Kahneman,
2003), we are confident that our results are valid. Finally, as most
qualitative studies also our study is based on a relative small,
non-randomly selected sample and does not allow generalizable
conclusions and hypotheses testing. Nonetheless, the present
qualitative study is the first which rigorously investigates both,
the tax auditors and taxpayers. Therefore, we are confident
that the present results are a fruitful starting point for future
quantitative research on tax compliance with larger samples from
different countries.
The current qualitative interview study can fuel further
quantitative research. The categories found in these interviews
can be used to develop more accurate measurement instruments
(see Supplementary Material for example questions and
scales) to evaluate tax administrative policies and to analyze
the relationship between different determinants of the tax
relationship and tax behaviors. Further, an important influencing
factor of the perception of power and trust, as well as tax behavior
might be the frequency of taxpayers’ contacts with the tax
authority. Also the employment of tax advisors, as intermediaries
between self-employed taxpayers, and the tax authority, may
have a significant impact on the taxpayers’ perception of the
tax authority. Future studies should test the causal link between
relationship determinants and tax compliance behaviors. Existing
studies on coercive and legitimate power have not considered
deadlines, different forms of reward power or personal support,
all of which may be considered determinants of compliance.
Some of the “known” categories such as public disclosure
continue to require further empirical investigation. Empirical
evidence regarding the effects (and side effects) of negative
disclosure through “black lists” and public shaming is also
limited; maybe shaming only effects middle class but not wealthy
tax evaders (Lenter et al., 2003; Perez-Truglia and Troiano, 2015;
Casal and Mittone, 2016). Empirical evidence regarding the effect
of positive disclosure (e.g., the Fairtax mark) is especially rare.
The main advantage of the current paper is that the
perspectives of both individual citizens and authorities were
considered. Based on this strong empirical grounding, the present
outcomes have considerable practical relevance. They indicate
that the relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers is of
inherent importance for compliance. Taxpayers do not simply
respond and tax auditors do not simply use command and
control, but rather demonstrate a sophisticated understanding
and nuanced behaviors when interacting with one another.
However, in most countries the training of tax auditors and
the approach of tax authorities continue to focus on “hard”
auditing and monitoring skills, whereas the soft skills used to
shape relationships with taxpayers are neglected. The present
results present a summary of instruments of coercive power,
legitimate power, reason-based trust, and implicit trust and can
be used to develop strategies to improve the relationship between
authorities and taxpayers, and training programs for tax auditors
aiming to improve their communication skills when interacting
with taxpayers. For instance, in workshops, setting deadlines
could be trained such that their perceived coerciveness is reduced.
A significant trend in tax administration is digitalization and
automating, as well as reducing the personal interaction between
tax authorities and taxpayers (Kochanova et al., 2017). Based
on the results presented here, in particular on the appreciation
of personal support and respect as novel categories of implicit
and reason-based trust, we argue that the resources invested in
cooperative relationship programs should be increased. Without
doubt, digital services that enhance tax handling for taxpayers
are required. However, relying solely on a machine-mediated
interaction between the tax authorities and taxpayers, with
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the aim to reduce personalized service costs, bears the risk
that tax behavior degenerates to a merely rational calculating
task. The social dimension of paying one’s contribution must
not be neglected.
ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of Declaration of Helsinki (7th revision, 2013)
and local ethical guidelines for studies with human participants
(including approval by an institutional review board) at the
Faculty of Psychology of the University of Vienna with written
informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
The protocol was approved by the institutional review board at
the Faculty of Psychology.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
EH, KG, and EK planned the study. KG and BH collected and
analyzed the data. KG, BH, EH, and EK wrote the manuscript.
FUNDING
This study was supported by The Austrian Science Fund
(FWF; project 24863-G16). Travel expenses were funded
by a scholarship of the Austrian Economic Chambers
(WKÖ) awarded to KG.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Jasmin Niess, Barbara Gschwendtner, Lisa Hofer, and
Roman Fuchsjäger for their assistance during data collection and
analyses. Parts of the data were presented at the ICAP conference
2014 in Paris, France.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.
2019.01034/full#supplementary-material
REFERENCES
Adler, P. S. (2001). Market, hierarchy, and trust: the knowledge economy and
the future of capitalism. Organ. Sci. 12, 215–234. doi: 10.1287/orsc.12.2.215.
10117
Allingham, M., and Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis.
J. Public Econ. 1, 323–338. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2
Alm, J., Cherry, T., Jones, M., and McKee, M. (2010). Taxpayer information
assistance services and tax compliance behavior. J. Econ. Psychol. 31, 577–586.
doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2010.03.018
Alm, J., Sanchez, I., and De Juan, A. (1995). Economic and noneconomic factors in
tax compliance. Kyklos 48, 3–18.
Alm, J., and Torgler, B. (2006). Culture differences and tax morale in the
United States and in Europe. J. Econ. Psychol. 27, 224–246. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.
2005.09.002
Alm, J., and Torgler, B. (2011). Do ethics matter? Tax compliance and morality.
J. Bus. Ethics 101, 1–17. doi: 10.1007/s10551-011-0761-9
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., and Feinstein, J. S. (1998). Tax compliance. J. Econ. Lit. 36,
818–860.
Avolio, B. J., and Bass, B. M. (1991). The Full Range Leadership Development
Programs: Basic and Advanced Manuals. Binghamton, NY: Taylor Francis.
Bazart, C., and Pickhard, M. (2011). Fighting income tax evasion with positive
rewards. Public Finance Rev. 39, 124–149. doi: 10.1177/1091142110381639
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J. Polit. Econ.
76, 169–217.
Behavioural Insights Team (2011). Annual Update 2010-2011. Cabinet Office,
London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/60537/Behaviour-Change-Insight-Team-
Annual-Update_acc.pdf (accessed April 29, 2019).
Bø, E. E., Slemrod, J., and Thorsesen, T. O. (2014). Taxes on the internet: deterrence
effects of public disclosure. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 7, 36–62. doi: 10.1257/pol.
20130330
Bradford, B., Huq, A., Jackson, J., and Roberts, B. (2014). What price fairness when
security is at stake? Police legitimacy in South Africa. Regul. Gov. 8, 246–268.
doi: 10.1111/rego.12012
Braithwaite, V. (2002). Taxing Democracy. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Braithwaite, V. (2003). “Dancing with Tax Authorities: Motivational Postures and
Non-compliant Actions,” in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance
and Evasion, ed. V. Braithwaite (Aldershot: Ashgate), 15–39.
Braithwaite, V. (2007). Responsive regulation and taxation: introduction. Law
Policy 29, 3–11.
Brown, R. E., and Mazur, M. J. (2003). IRS’s comprehensive approach to compliance
measurement. Nat. Tax J. 56, 689–700. doi: 10.17310/ntj.2003.3.15
Burgess, M., Enzle, M. E., and Schmaltz, R. (2004). Defeating the potentially
deleterious effects of externally imposed deadlines: practitioners’ rule-of-
thumb. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 30, 868–877. doi: 10.1177/01461672042
64089
Casal, S., and Mittone, L. (2016). Social esteem versus social stigma: the role of
anonymity in an income reporting game. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 124, 55–66.
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.014
Castelfranchi, C., and Falcone, R. (2010). Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and
Computational Model. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Castro, L., and Scartascini, C. (2013). Tax compliance and enforcement in the
pampas. evidence from a field experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 116, 65–82.
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.002
Chirico, M., Inman, R., Loeffler, C., MacDonald, J., and Sieg, H. (2017).
Procrastination and Property Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field
Experiment. NBER Working Papers. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/
w23243 (accessed April 29, 2019).
Cummings, R. G., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M., and Torgler, B. (2009). Tax
morale affects tax compliance: evidence from surveys and an artefactual field
experiment. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 70, 447–457. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.
02.010
Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 18:105. doi: 10.1037/h0030644
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-process accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social
cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 255–278. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.59.
103006.093629
Falkinger, J., and Walther, H. (1991). Rewards versus penalties: on a new
policy against tax evasion. Public Finance Q. 19, 67–79. doi: 10.1177/
109114219101900104
Feld, L. P., and Frey, B. S. (2002). Trust breeds trust: how taxpayers are treated.
Econ. Gov. 3, 87–99. doi: 10.1007/s101010100032
Feld, L. P., and Frey, B. S. (2007). Tax compliance as the result of a psychological
tax contract: the role of incentives and responsive regulation. Law Policy 29,
102–120. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x
Feld, L. P., Frey, B. S., and Torgler, B. (2006). Rewarding Honest Taxpayers?
Evidence on the Impact of Rewards from Field Experiments. Working Paper
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1034
fpsyg-10-01034 May 13, 2019 Time: 12:6 # 12
Gangl et al. Relationship Between Tax Auditors and Taxpayers
No. 16. Available at: http://www.webmail.crema-research.ch/papers/2006-16.
pdf (accessed April 29, 2019).
Feld, L. P., and Tyran, J. R. (2002). Tax evasion and voting: an experimental
analysis. Kyklos 55, 197–221. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0150277
Fischer, C. T. (ed.) (2005). Qualitative Research Methods for Psychologists:
Introduction Through Empirical Studies. Burlington, MA: Academic Press.
Freiberg, A. (2010). The Tools of Regulation. Sydney, NSW: The Federation Press.
French, J. R., and Raven, B. (1959). “The Bases of Social Power,” in Studies in Social
Power, ed. C. Cartwright (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan), 150–167.
Frey, B. (1997). A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. Econ. J. 107,
1043–1053. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00006.x
Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., and Kirchler, E. (2016a). “Power of Authorities
and Trust in Authorities Determine the Interaction Climate and Tax
Compliance,” in Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research, Vol. 2, ed. D. Salter
(Birmingham: Fiscal Publications), 87–102.
Gangl, K., Torgler, B., and Kirchler, E. (2016b). Patriotism’s impact on cooperation
with the state: an experimental study on tax compliance. Polit. Psychol. 37,
867–881. doi: 10.1111/pops.12294
Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., and Kirchler, E. (2015). Tax authorities’ interaction with
taxpayers: a conception of compliance in social dilemmas by power and trust.
New Ideas Psychol. 37, 13–23. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2014.12.001
Gangl, K., Kirchler, E., Lorenz, C., and Torgler, B. (2017). “Wealthy Tax Non-
filers in a Developing Nation: The Roles of Taxpayer Knowledge, Perceived
Corruption and Service Orientation in Pakistan,” in Building Trust in Taxation,
eds B. Peeters, H. Gribnau, and J. Badisco (Antwerpen: Intersentia), 354–374.
Gangl, K., Muehlbacher, S., de Groot, M., Goslinga, S., Hofmann, E., Kogler,
C., et al. (2013). How can i help you?” Perceived service orientation of tax
authorities and tax compliance. FinanzArchiv 69, 487–510. doi: 10.1002/hpm.
2300
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., and Vlaev, I. (2017). The behavioralist
as tax collector: using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance.
J. Public Econ. 148, 14–31. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003
Hammar, H., Jagers, S. C., and Nordblom, K. (2009). Perceived tax evasion and
the importance of trust. J. Socio Econ. 38, 238–245. doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2008.
07.003
Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., and Kirchler, E. (2015).
Does the sole description of a tax authority affect tax evasion? The impact of
described coercive and legitimate power. PLoS One 10:e0123355. doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0123355
Hartner, M., Rechberger, S., Kirchler, E., and Wenzel, M. (2011). Perceived
distributive fairness of EU transfer payments, outcome favorability, identity,
and EU-Tax compliance. Law Policy 33, 60–81. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2010.
00330.x
Haslam, S. A., and Fiske, A. P. (1999). Relational models theory: a confirmatory
factor analysis. Pers. Relat. 6, 241–250. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6811.1999.tb00190.x
Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Kirchler, E., and Stark, J. (2014). Enhancing tax
compliance through coercive and legitimate power of authorities. Law Policy
36, 290–313. doi: 10.1111/lapo.12021
Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M., and Kirchler, E.
(2017a). Authorities’ coercive and legitimate power: the impact on cognitions
underlying cooperation. Front. Psychol. 8:5. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00005
Hofmann, E., Voracek, M., Bock, C., and Kirchler, E. (2017b). Tax compliance
across sociodemographic categories: meta-analyses of survey studies in 111
countries. J. Econ. Psychol. 62, 63–71. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.06.005
Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Myhill, A., Quinton, P., and Tyler, T. R. (2012).
Why do people comply with the law? Legitimacy and the influence of legal
institutions. Br. J. Criminol. 52, 1051–1071. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azs032
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded
rationality. Am. Psychol. 58, 697–720. doi: 10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697
Kastlunger, B., Kirchler, E., Mittone, L., and Pitters, J. (2009). Sequences of audits,
tax compliance, and taxpaying strategies. J. Econ. Psychol. 30, 405–418. doi:
10.1016/j.joep.2008.10.004
Kastlunger, B., Muehlbacher, S., Kirchler, E., and Mittone, L. (2010). What goes
around comes around? Experimental evidence of the effect of rewards on tax
compliance. Public Finance Rev. 39, 150–167. doi: 10.1177/1091142110376518
King-Casas, B., Tomlin, D., Anen, C., Camerer, C. F., Quartz, S. R., and Montague,
P. R. (2005). Getting to know you: reputation and trust in a two-person
economic exchange. Science 308, 78–83. doi: 10.1126/science.1108062
Kirchler, E. (2007). The Economic Psychology of Tax Behavior. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., and Wahl, I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax
compliance: the “Slippery Slope” framework. J. Econ. Psychol. 29, 210–225.
doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2007.05.004
Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B., and Schneider, F. (2003). Everyday representations of
tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: do legal differences matter? J. Econ.
Psychol. 24, 535–553. doi: 10.1016/s0167-4870(02)00164-2
Kirchler, E., Muehlbacher, S., Kastlunger, B., and Wahl, I. (2010). “Why Pay taxes?
A Review of Tax Compliance Decisions,” in Developing Alternative Frameworks
for Explaining Tax Compliance, eds J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez, and B. Torgler
(Abingdon: Routledge), 15–31.
Kirchler, E., Niemirowski, A., and Wearing, A. (2006). Shared subjective views,
intent to cooperate and tax compliance: similarities between australian
taxpayers and tax officers. J. Econ. Psychol. 27, 502–517. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.
2006.01.005
Kirchler, E., and Wahl, I. (2010). Tax compliance inventory TAX-I: designing an
inventory for surveys of tax compliance. J. Econ. Psychol. 31, 331–346. doi:
10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.002
Kochanova, A., Zahid, H., and Bradley, L. (2017). E-government can be good
for business. LSC Business Review. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85517/
1/businessreview-2017-10-04-e-government-can-be-good-for.pdf (accessed
April 29, 2019).
Koessler, A. K., Torgler, B., Feld, L., and Frey, B. S. (2016). Commitment to Pay
Taxes: A Field Experiment on the Importance of Promise. TTPI working Paper
10/2016. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877464 (accessed April 29,
2019).
Kogler, C., Batrancea, L., Nichita, A., Pantya, J., Belianin, A., and Kirchler, E. (2013).
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: testing the assumptions of
the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia. J. Econ.
Psychol. 34, 169–180. doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.09.010
Lenter, D., Shackelford, D., and Slemrod, J. (2003). Public disclosure of corporate
tax return information: accounting, economics, and legal perspectives. Nat. Tax
J. 56, 803–830. doi: 10.17310/ntj.2003.4.06
Lewicki, R. J., and Bunker, B. B. (1996). “Developing and Maintaining Trust
in Work Relationships,” in Trust in Organizations, eds R. M. Kramer and
T. R. Tyler (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications), 114–139. doi: 10.4135/
9781452243610.n7
Lewin, K., Lippitt, R., and White, R. K. (1939). Patterns of aggressive behavior in
experimentally created “Social Climates”. J. Soc. Psychol. 10, 271–299.
Luttmer, E. F. P., and Singhal, M. (2014). Tax morale. J. Econ. Perspect. 28, 149–168.
Malhotra, D., and Murnighan, J. K. (2002). The effects of contracts on interpersonal
trust. Adm. Sci. Q. 47, 534–559. doi: 10.1037/a0012851
Misztal, B. A. (1996). Trust in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Moscovici, S. (1998). “The History and Actuality of Social Representations,” in The
Psychology of the Social, ed. U. Flick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
208–247.
Murphy, K. (2004). The role of trust in nurturing compliance: a study of accused
tax avoiders. Law Hum. Behav. 28, 187–209. doi: 10.1023/b:lahu.0000022322.
94776.ca
National Audit Office (2016). HMRC’s Approach to Collecting Tax from High
Net Worth Individuals. Available from: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/HMRCs-approach-to-collecting-tax-from-high-net-worth-
individuals.pdf (accessed July 8, 2017)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2001).
Compliance Measurement – Practical Note. Prepared by the OECD Committee
of Fiscal Affairs Forum on Strategy Management. Available at: https://www.oecd.
org/tax/administration/1908448.pdf (accessed August 1, 2018)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2004).
Compliance Risk Management: Managing and Improving Tax Compliance.
Available at: https://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/33818656.pdf (accessed
December 13, 2017)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2013).
Co-operative Compliance: A Framework. From Enhanced Relationship to
Co-operative Compliance. Paris: OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/9789264200
852-en
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational
control mechanisms. Manag. Sci. 25, 833–848. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.25.9.833
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1034
fpsyg-10-01034 May 13, 2019 Time: 12:6 # 13
Gangl et al. Relationship Between Tax Auditors and Taxpayers
Perez-Truglia, R., and Troiano, U. (2015). Shaming Tax Delinquents: Theory and
Evidence from a Field Experiment in the United States. NBER Working Paper
No. 21264. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21264 (accessed April 29,
2019).
Peters, S. (2010). Qualitative research methods in mental health. Evid.Based Ment.
Health 13:35. doi: 10.1136/ebmh.13.2.35
Pommerehne, W. W., and Weck-Hannemann, H. (1996). Tax rates, tax
administration and income tax evasion in Switzerland. Public Choice 88, 161–
170.
Qsr International Pty Ltd (2010). NVivo Qualitative Data Analysis Software
(Version 9).
Raven, B. H. (1993). The bases of power: origins and recent developments. J. Soc.
Issues 49, 227–251. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1993.tb01191.x
Raven, B. H., Schwarzwald, J., and Koslowsky, M. (1998). Conceptualizing and
measuring a power/interaction model of interpersonal influence. J. Appl. Soc.
Psychol. 28, 307–332. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1998.tb01708.x
Ripperger, T. (1998). Ökonomik des Vertrauens: Analyse eines
Organisationsprinzips [The Economics of Trust: Analysis of an Organization
Principle]. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Schneider, F., Montenegro, C. E., and Buehn, A. (2010). New estimates for the
shadow economies all over the world. Int. Econ. J. 24, 443–461. doi: 10.1080/
10168737.2010.525974
Scholz, J. T., and Lubell, M. (1998). Trust and taxpaying: testing the heuristic
approach to collective action. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 42, 398–417.
Schreier, M. (2012). Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
Simone, L. D., Sansing, R. C., and Seidman, J. K. (2013). When are enhanced
relationship tax compliance programs mutually beneficial? Acc. Rev. 88, 1971–
1991. doi: 10.2308/accr-50525
Srinivasan, T. N. (1973). Tax evasion: a model. J. Public Econ. 2, 339–346.
Torgler, B. (2002). Speaking to theorists and searching for facts: tax morale and tax
compliance in experiments. J. Econ. Surveys 16, 657–683. doi: 10.1111/1467-
6419.00185
Torgler, B., and Schneider, F. (2009). The impact of tax morale and institutional
quality on the shadow economy. J. Econ. Psychol. 30, 228–245. doi: 10.1016/j.
joep.2008.08.004
Turner, J. C. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: a three-process theory. Eur. J.
Soc. Psychol. 35, 1–22. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.244
Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why People Obey the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and
Compliance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tyler, T. R. (1997). Procedural fairness and compliance with the law.
schweizerische zeitschrift fur volkswirtschaft und statistik. Swiss J. Econ. Stat.
133, 219–240.
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
van Dijke, M., and Verboon, P. (2010). Trust in authorities as a boundary condition
to procedural fairness effects on tax compliance. J. Econ. Psychol. 31, 80–91.
doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2009.10.005
Wahl, I., Kastlunger, B., and Kirchler, E. (2010). Trust in authorities and
power to enforce tax compliance: an empirical analysis of the “Slippery
Slope Framework”. Law Policy 32, 383–406. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2010.
00327.x
Wenzel, M. (2002). The impact of outcome orientation and justice concerns on
tax compliance: the role of taxpayers identity. J. Appl. Psychol. 87, 629–645.
doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.629
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 Gangl, Hartl, Hofmann and Kirchler. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1034
